Page (iii)
3/. The Chart : Capt GD Pari-Huws: "This is the first time in my life I've ever heard of the captain of a ship allowing his navigational decisions to be made for him - and by some Committee from Liverpool who knew nothing at all about the Menai Strait." Page 9 describes in some detail the very unusal proceedure adopted to calculate depths by Capt Goddard's Chart , and that this is certainly not made obvious by the chart title. It also explains how easy it would have been for Capt Hewitt instead to have fallen into the trap of adding back to soundings the height of the tide at Menai Bridge at any instant in order to figure the depths at that time anywhere in the Swellies. This would have led him to the faulted concluson that he wouldn't have the ship's draft over Cheese Rock before 0920,(page 12) with the result that a). He would not have been prepared to pass under Britannia Bridge 20 minutes before that time like Pilot wanted, and b). Since Fig.8 shows the ship would actually have 2' 6" clearance at 0920, it would have led him to believe that the outward transit was a lot more marginal than it already really was, and might even have led him to believe it impossible. This raises the possibility that Capt Hewitt had refused responsibility for the outward tow, which in turn would explain why Capt Hewitt had involved Committee in planning the outward transit instead. c). It would also explain why 0920 (which was dangerously late on a big tide for a 20 minute tow) was seen as the earliest time the ship had her own draft over the rock, and thus became the "critical time" in Committee's 'timetable'. For 'political' reasons it also fitted in very well with the Caernarvon Harbourmaster's recommendation to start the transit at 0925 (L.pool -1.53). - An astonishing time which was even later, but one which conveniently would have the outward appearance of convincing supporting evidence,(note 18) drawing attention away from the perceived need to delay the transit until 0920 on account of the draft. (The cleverly worded Sub-Committee Report exploits this fully by claiming that the ship proceeded five minutes before the time recommended by the Harbourmaster "so as to have five minutes in hand".)(Sub-Com P_1 line 14)
4/. Some strange facts :- a). Capt Hewitt was Staff Captain under Capt Goddard before, and during the '49 inbound transit. As the man who one day would be charged with bringing the ship back, the final decission on whether or not the ship should go inbound through The Swellies was rightly his. But not only was he never afforded this professional courtesy, he was never privy to any of Capt Goddard's tidal figurings, nor was he offered the invaluable experience of any proactive participation in the inbound transit. His first realisation of the parlous predicament into which both he and the ship had been placed was not until he came to address the impending 1953 outward tow. ................................................................................................................................................. . .. .. b). The first paragraph of The Investigating Sub-Committee Report explains that Capt Hewitt obtained his Menai Strait tidal information from Bidston Observatory, Birkenhead, and navigation information from the Caernarvon Harbourmaster.(Note 18) But surely the most obvious and vastly superior source of such information was the local pilots who were doing this sort of thing every day in what after all was their own back yard. To this day the pilots remain outraged that they alone were never consulted(Sub-Com report p_2 Line 4), and that on the outward transit itself pilots' advice was repeatedly ignored.(see note 13) Yet local knowledge is paramount to navigating these difficult waters where the swift running tides don't remotely resemble those anywhere else in the world.(see Menai Straits Tides in detail) Admiralty Pilot Vol 37: "The navigation is dangerous, and should never be attempted without an experienced pilot."(p-286 line 42) .. . ... .. .. .. .. ............................ .. .. .. .... .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. ... .. c). Apart from Capt Hewitt's resorting to the distant Bidston Observatory for his tidal information, G.A.B. King records that serious preperations began early in 1953, and "Taking soundings and current rates became part of the daily curriculum". Why was this neccessary? Surely this had already been done in 1949. Capt Goddard's comprehensive tidal information had been gathered in ship's time by ship's personnel using ship's facilities. It was the property of the ship and must surely still have been there - unless of course it had been removed - and if so for what possible reason? Before committing the ship to a dead-end passage a thorough investigation of the prospects for her outward tow was no more than elementary routine proceedure, upon which the feasibility of the entire project depended. I can't think it remotely likely that Capt Goddard neglected to do this. But that 1949 tidal information would have been proof beyond doubt that Management had been well aware of the implications for the outbound transit before deciding to send the ship through. Instead it appears that Capt Hewitt was left to rediscover this for himself in 1953 when it was too late.
5/. The Inquirey : The Investigating Sub-Committee confined its enquiries to the outbound navigation, but the loss had its roots four years before then and there was a lot more to investigate than just the navigation. Capt Goddard spoke of "the desperate need to get the ship through to open up the Conway shore